Entering Japan and Korea: APPI, PIPA and Korea’s AI Framework Act
A China-based AI company serves Japanese and Korean business or consumer customers through an offshore entity or a local subsidiary, processes local residents’ personal information, and may be treated as an AI business operator supplying services in those markets.
Prerequisites
- Extraterritorial application is confirmed: Japan’s APPI applies extraterritorially to operators handling the personal information of individuals in Japan; Korea requires offshore handlers to appoint a domestic representative.
- You have mapped whether the product is used for “significant decisions” or high-impact scenarios (employment, credit, healthcare, public services), which drives the high-impact AI determination under Korea’s AI Framework Act.
- You have estimated the order of magnitude of training compute, to judge whether the compute-threshold duties under Korea’s AI Framework Act are triggered.
- Japan’s 2026 amendment act was promulgated on 17 July 2026 but is **not yet in force**: commencement is in principle within two years of promulgation on a date to be fixed by Cabinet Order, and as at this review (12 Sep 2026) no such date has been fixed; concrete thresholds and publication items still await the forthcoming cabinet orders and PPC rules. The new duties (facial feature data, individuals under 16, limits on the scope of contractor processing, and the surcharge regime) are therefore **transition-period preparation items, not current obligations**, and this playbook schedules on a dual track: comply with the law as it stands, prepare for the amendment.
Stages (20–33 weeks, estimate)
1. Stage 1 — Extraterritorial application and appointing local representatives
3–5 weeksComplete the three items without which you are simply not in the market: confirm the APPI’s extraterritorial application and build Japan-side contact and response capability; appoint a domestic representative under Korea’s PIPA and publish it in the privacy policy; and, if treated as an AI business operator, appoint a domestic representative under the AI Framework Act and file with MSIT. The three rest on different legal bases and may be held by the same service provider, but the mandates and published particulars must be prepared separately.
Obligations in this stage
- Confirm extraterritorial application and build a Japan-facing contact and response capabilityJapan Act on the Protection of Personal Information (APPI) · Art. 171 · Severity High
- Designate a domestic representative and disclose it in the privacy policyKorea Personal Information Protection Act (PIPA) · Art. 31-2 · Severity Critical
- Designate a domestic representative and notify MSITKorea AI Framework Act · Act Art. 36; Enforcement Decree Art. 29 · Severity Critical
Evidence to retain
- · Extraterritorial application memorandum, with the basis set out separately for Japan and Korea
- · Japan-side contact and response arrangement (named contact, response language, time-zone coverage)
- · Korean domestic representative mandate and the particulars published in the privacy policy
- · AI Framework Act domestic representative filing materials and the acknowledgement of receipt
Common blockers
- · Treating the PIPA domestic representative and the AI Framework Act domestic representative as one item: each statute has its own filing and publication requirements.
- · A representative in name only with no response capability: regulator enquiries and individual requests go straight to the representative, and an unanswerable representative is effectively none.
- · Missing Japanese/Korean external texts: local notices and request intake need the local language, and English-only is treated as a failure to notify.
2. Stage 2 — Japan APPI baseline and adaptation to the 2026 amendment
5–8 weeksGet the baseline right first: specify and publish the purpose of use and do not exceed it; obtain prior consent for special care-required personal information; implement security control measures; supervise contractors; report data breaches to the Commission and notify individuals; and use one of the three routes for providing personal data to third parties in foreign countries. Then recalibrate against the 2026 amendment: the publicity duty and the ban on opt-out provision for facial feature data (the change with the largest impact on computer-vision products); the intervention of legal representatives for individuals under 16; the bar on contractors processing beyond what the entrusted business requires; and the evidentiary and internal-control demands created by the surcharge regime.
Obligations in this stage
- Specify and publicise the purpose of use and do not exceed itJapan Act on the Protection of Personal Information (APPI) · Arts. 17, 18, 21 · Severity High
- Obtain prior consent before acquiring special care-required personal informationJapan Act on the Protection of Personal Information (APPI) · Art. 20(2) · Severity Critical
- Implement security control measuresJapan Act on the Protection of Personal Information (APPI) · Art. 23 · Severity Critical
- Exercise necessary and appropriate supervision over contractorsJapan Act on the Protection of Personal Information (APPI) · Art. 25 · Severity High
- Report breaches to the PPC and notify affected individualsJapan Act on the Protection of Personal Information (APPI) · Art. 26 · Severity Critical
- Three routes for providing personal data to a third party in a foreign countryJapan Act on the Protection of Personal Information (APPI) · Art. 28 · Severity Critical
- Publicity duty for face-feature data and ban on opt-out third-party provisionJapan 2026 Act Partially Amending the Act on the Protection of Personal Information · Arts. 21-2, 27(2), 35(7)–(8) (as amended) · Severity Critical
- Contractors must not handle entrusted personal data beyond what the entrusted work requiresJapan 2026 Act Partially Amending the Act on the Protection of Personal Information · Arts. 30-3, 58-2 (as amended) · Severity Critical
- Prepare evidence and internal controls for the new surcharge regimeJapan 2026 Act Partially Amending the Act on the Protection of Personal Information · Arts. 148-3 to 148-17 (as amended) · Severity High
Deliverables
Evidence to retain
- · Japanese-language text specifying and publishing the purpose of use, with version history
- · Inventory of special care-required personal information processing and consent records
- · Security control measures documentation across the organisational, personnel, physical and technical categories
- · Contractor supervision programme and scope-of-entrustment definitions matching the amended scope limit
- · Publicity content for facial feature data processing and evidence that opt-out provision is blocked
- · Record of the route chosen for provision to foreign third parties and the accompanying notification materials
Common blockers
- · Drafting the purpose of use broadly so “anything is covered later”: Japanese practice expects genuine specificity, and an over-broad purpose invites challenge on individual requests and inspections.
- · Carrying over the old opt-out approach in facial-recognition products: the amendment does expressly ban opt-out provision for facial feature data, but that ban bites only from the commencement date fixed by Cabinet Order (not fixed as at 12 Sep 2026). The present risk is therefore not that you are already in breach, but that redesigning the product and rebuilding the consent path may take longer than the transition window — schedule backwards from the commencement date and keep dated evidence of when the rework completed.
- · Contractor agreements that do not bound the processing scope: the amended scope limit requires contract and practice to match, and blanket authorisations are no longer safe.
3. Stage 3 — Korea PIPA baseline
5–8 weeksKorea’s compliance density exceeds Japan’s and enforcement is active. Six items to close: determine a statutory basis for each processing activity and obtain compliant consent; place every overseas transfer on one of the five statutory routes in Article 28-8; implement the right to refuse an automated decision, the right to request an explanation, and publication of the decision criteria; notify individuals and file with the PIPC on breach events; assign ultimate responsibility to the business owner/representative and appoint a chief privacy officer; and implement safety-assurance measures and prevent contractor violations. Handlers meeting the scale thresholds must additionally obtain personal information protection certification.
Obligations in this stage
- Establish a lawful basis for each processing activity and obtain compliant consentKorea Personal Information Protection Act (PIPA) · Arts. 15, 17, 18, 22, 22-2 · Severity Critical
- Cross-border transfers must rest on one of the five routes in Art. 28-8Korea Personal Information Protection Act (PIPA) · Art. 28-8 · Severity Critical
- Right to refuse automated decisions, to request an explanation, and duty to publish the criteriaKorea Personal Information Protection Act (PIPA) · Art. 37-2 · Severity High
- Notify data subjects and report to PIPC on a breach, including the new 2026 duty to notify a possible leakKorea Personal Information Protection Act (PIPA) · Art. 34 · Severity Critical
- Owner/representative accountability and appointment of the Chief Privacy OfficerKorea Personal Information Protection Act (PIPA) · Arts. 30-3, 31 · Severity High
- Implement safety-assurance measures and prevent violations by entrusted processorsKorea Personal Information Protection Act (PIPA) · Arts. 26(4), 29, 64-2(1)9 · Severity Critical
- Obtain privacy certification where the size thresholds are metKorea Personal Information Protection Act (PIPA) · Arts. 32-2(1) proviso, 75(2)15, 28-8(1)4 · Severity High
Evidence to retain
- · Processing-activity to statutory-basis mapping table, in a Korean-language external version
- · Overseas transfer route determinations and supporting documents, mapped against each limb of Article 28-8
- · Published criteria for automated decisions plus the intake process for refusal and explanation requests
- · Chief privacy officer appointment and the note on safeguarding their independence
- · Evidence of safety-assurance measure implementation and contractor management records
- · Certification applicability determination and, where applicable, the plan to obtain it
Common blockers
- · Treating consent as a universal basis: Korea is strict on the form and itemisation of consent, and bundled consent is readily rejected on inspection.
- · Overseas transfers not resting on a statutory route: a Chinese recipient requires limb-by-limb reasoning, and a general “we have consent” is usually insufficient.
- · Not publishing the criteria for automated decisions: this is a right individuals can assert directly, and its absence generates complaints immediately.
4. Stage 4 — Adapting to Korea’s AI Framework Act
4–7 weeksLand four workstreams: transparency (prior notice that AI is in use, labelling of generated content, and additional notice for realistic synthetic content); the safety-assurance duty and result submission for models above the compute threshold; the prior self-check and application for ministerial confirmation for high-impact AI, together with the six statutory measures under Article 34(1); and the fundamental-rights impact assessment (a best-efforts duty, but one asked about in procurement and regulator dialogue). Also build the internal process for cooperating with fact-finding and executing suspension or remediation orders.
Obligations in this stage
- AI transparency: prior notice, labelling of generative output and notice for realistic synthetic contentKorea AI Framework Act · Act Art. 31; Enforcement Decree Art. 23 · Severity Critical
- Safety-assurance duty and results submission for models above the compute thresholdKorea AI Framework Act · Act Art. 32; Enforcement Decree Art. 24 · Severity Critical
- Prior self-check for high-impact AI and optional ministerial confirmationKorea AI Framework Act · Art. 33 · Severity High
- Statutory measures for high-impact AI (the six items of Art. 34(1))Korea AI Framework Act · Act Art. 34; Enforcement Decree Art. 27 and Annex 1 · Severity Critical
- Fundamental-rights impact assessment for high-impact AI (endeavour obligation)Korea AI Framework Act · Act Art. 35; Enforcement Decree Art. 28 · Severity High
- Cooperate with fact-finding and comply with suspension or corrective ordersKorea AI Framework Act · Arts. 40, 43 · Severity High
Evidence to retain
- · Interface evidence (in Korean) for prior AI-use notice and labelling of generated content
- · Compute-threshold determination record and the safety-assurance implementation report
- · High-impact AI self-check record and the application for ministerial confirmation
- · Register tracking implementation of each of the Article 34 statutory measures
- · Fundamental-rights impact assessment report, where conducted
- · Internal process documentation for cooperating with fact-finding and executing orders
Common blockers
- · Letting sales fill in the “high-impact” determination from what the customer says: the determination rests on the statutory criteria for the use case, not the customer’s characterisation.
- · Labelling only inside your own interface: content must remain identifiable after it leaves the product, or the transparency duty is hollow.
- · A compute-threshold determination with no measurement basis: as with the equivalent EU duty, it needs a reviewable estimation method and raw records.
5. Stage 5 — Commercial landing and ongoing upkeep
3–5 weeksTurn compliance output into procurement material that Japanese and Korean enterprise buyers accept, and move into an upkeep cadence. On the Japan side, align with the national guidelines and basic plan issued under the AI Promotion Act while being clear that the Act does not displace compliance judgements under existing law. On the Korea side, maintain certification, representative filings and fact-finding response capability. Japanese and Korean corporates typically re-review vendors annually and require local-language materials, so putting the refresh cadence on the calendar costs less than improvising.
Obligations in this stage
- Align with the Art. 13 State guidelines and the Art. 18 AI Basic PlanJapan AI Promotion Act · Arts. 13, 18 · Severity Low
- Do not treat the Promotion Act as a substitute for compliance under existing lawJapan AI Promotion Act · Arts. 1, 3, 13 · Severity Medium
- Exercise necessary and appropriate supervision over contractorsJapan Act on the Protection of Personal Information (APPI) · Art. 25 · Severity High
- Implement safety-assurance measures and prevent violations by entrusted processorsKorea Personal Information Protection Act (PIPA) · Arts. 26(4), 29, 64-2(1)9 · Severity Critical
Deliverables
Evidence to retain
- · Customer compliance packs in Japanese and Korean
- · Alignment note against the national guidelines and basic plan (Japan side)
- · Annual upkeep calendar (certification renewal, representative particulars updates, material refresh)
- · Incident register and a cross-jurisdiction notification-deadline comparison table
Common blockers
- · Reading Japan’s AI Promotion Act as a safe harbour: it does not change compliance judgements under existing law, and misreading it leaves the personal-information side exposed.
- · English-only materials: Japanese and Korean procurement generally expects local-language documents, and English alone triggers requests for supplementary filings during review.
Common failure modes
- · Using one pan-APAC pack for both Japan and Korea: statutory bases, representative regimes, notification deadlines and language requirements all differ.
- · Preparing materials against Japan’s pre-2026 text: facial feature data, individuals under 16 and the contractor scope limit are substantive changes, not drafting tweaks.
- · Reading Korea’s AI Framework Act as aspirational legislation: it carries operative provisions on high-impact determination, compute-threshold duties, domestic representatives and cooperation with investigations.
- · Ignoring the “business owner responsibility” character of both regimes: Korea expressly places ultimate responsibility on the owner/representative, and pushing all compliance down to the engineering team does not hold up in governance review.
- · Implementing generated-content labelling as a visual watermark only: the additional notice requirement for realistic synthetic content is a different obligation from a visible watermark.
- · Underestimating local-language cost: notices, consent interfaces, complaint intake and representative communications all require local language and local time-zone coverage.
Sources (12)
- Personal Information Protection Commission, Japan — Laws and Guidelines pagePersonal Information Protection Commission, Japan · retrieved 2026-09-12
- e-Gov Law Search entry for the Japanese AI Promotion Act (Act No. 53 of 2025)e-Gov Law Search, Digital Agency of Japan · published 2025-06-04 · retrieved 2026-09-12
- Personal Information Protection Commission (Korea) — English sitePersonal Information Protection Commission, Korea · retrieved 2026-09-12
- Framework Act on Artificial Intelligence Development and Establishment of a Foundation for Trust (Korea), Act No. 21311 — full textKorea Ministry of Government Legislation — Korea Law Information Centre open API · published 2026-01-20 · retrieved 2026-09-12
- Act on the Protection of Personal Information (Act No. 57 of 2003), Japan — consolidated text via e-Gov Law APIe-Gov Law Search, Digital Agency of Japan · published 2003-05-30 · retrieved 2026-09-12
- Personal Information Protection Act (Korea), Act No. 21445, in force 11 Sep 2026 — full textKorea Ministry of Government Legislation — Korea Law Information Centre open API · published 2026-03-10 · retrieved 2026-09-12
- Enforcement Decree of the Framework Act on AI Development and Establishment of a Foundation for Trust (Korea), in force 20 Aug 2026 — full textKorea Ministry of Government Legislation — Korea Law Information Centre open API · published 2026-08-18 · retrieved 2026-09-12
- Personal Information Protection Commission (Japan) — English legal texts indexPersonal Information Protection Commission, Japan · retrieved 2026-09-12
- PPC (Japan) — Outline of the Act Partially Amending the Act on the Protection of Personal Information etc. (PDF)Secretariat, Personal Information Protection Commission, Japan · published 2026-07-17 · retrieved 2026-09-12
- Korea AI Framework Act — official statement of reasons for the partial amendment (Act No. 21311)Korea Ministry of Government Legislation — Korea Law Information Centre · published 2026-01-20 · retrieved 2026-09-12
- Act on Promotion of Research, Development and Utilisation of AI-Related Technologies (Act No. 53 of 2025), Japan — text via e-Gov Law APIe-Gov Law Search, Digital Agency of Japan · published 2025-06-04 · retrieved 2026-09-12
- PPC (Japan) — 2026 (Reiwa 8) amendment to the Act on the Protection of Personal Information, official pagePersonal Information Protection Commission, Japan · published 2026-07-17 · retrieved 2026-09-12
Content as of 2026-09-12 · corpus 2026.09|Compiled from public official sources with links and review dates for compliance decision support. Rules change; have licensed professionals review before external disclosure, regulatory filing or contractual commitments.