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South KoreaAmendedRelevance to Chinese AI firms: CriticalData & privacyCross-border dataAI regulation

Korea Personal Information Protection Act (PIPA)

Personal Information Protection Act

National Assembly of the Republic of Korea; enforced by the Personal Information Protection Commission (PIPC) · Act No. 21445 (promulgated 10 Mar 2026, in force 11 Sep 2026)

PIPA is Korea’s general personal information statute. The 2023 overhaul established five routes for cross-border transfer, the right to refuse and to an explanation of automated decisions, and surcharges of up to 3% of total revenue. The 2026 amendment (Act No. 21445, in force 11 September 2026) adds three things that matter to foreign entrants: a higher surcharge tier of up to 10% of total revenue (or KRW 5 billion where revenue is absent or not ascertainable) for serious or repeated violations; express designation of the business owner or representative as the ultimate person responsible for personal information processing and protection, with reinforced CPO staffing, budget and designation-filing requirements; and expansion of breach notification to forgery, alteration and damage, plus a new duty to notify where there is a possibility of a leak. Mandatory certification under Art. 32-2 applies from 1 July 2027.

Verified against official sources · 2026-09-12Verified against official text

Does this apply to me?

A Chinese AI company falls within PIPA where it: (1) supplies apps, websites or model APIs to users in Korea and processes their personal information; (2) has no address or place of business in Korea but meets the revenue and data-holding thresholds set by Presidential Decree, in which case it must designate a domestic representative in writing and is treated as having committed any violation by that representative; (3) takes processing work on entrustment from a Korean company and is caught by the Art. 26 entrustment rules, where the principal’s failure to manage and supervise is itself surcharge-eligible; or (4) moves Korean personal information into China — Art. 28-8 defines “transfer” to include provision (including where the data can be queried), entrusted processing and storage, so merely making data queryable from Korea on a Chinese server is a transfer.

Key industries: All industries, GenAI & foundation models, Enterprise SaaS, Fintech AI, Computer vision, AI agents

Application timeline

  1. 2023-09-15

    The 2023 overhaul largely takes effect, adding multiple cross-border transfer routes and automated-decision rights

    Article 28-8 (cross-border transfer), Article 28-9 (transfer suspension orders) and Article 37-2 (right to refuse and to an explanation of automated decisions) were all inserted by the 14 March 2023 amendment.

  2. 2026-03-10

    2026 amendment promulgated as Act No. 21445

    Responding to successive large-scale breaches at telecom, financial and platform operators, it strengthens surcharges, makes the business owner or representative expressly responsible, reinforces the CPO’s authority and independence, introduces notification of the possibility of a leak, and makes privacy certification mandatory for processors above a prescribed size.

  3. 2026-09-11

    2026 amendment enters into force, six months after promulgation

    Article 30-3 (owner/representative responsibility), the strengthened Article 31 CPO regime, the expanded Article 34 notification scope including notification of a possible leak, and the new 10% surcharge tier in Article 64-2(2) apply from this date; the accompanying Enforcement Decree (No. 36671, promulgated 10 Sep 2026) commences the same day.

  4. 2027-07-01

    Mandatory privacy certification (proviso to Art. 32-2(1)) begins to apply

    Processors meeting thresholds set by Presidential Decree on revenue and processing scale must obtain privacy certification; failure attracts an administrative fine under Art. 75(2)15.

Obligations (8)

Each states its trigger, the evidence to retain and the clause it comes from

Cross-border transfers must rest on one of the five routes in Art. 28-8

Severity CriticalArt. 28-8

Transfers abroad — defined to include provision (including where the data can be queried), entrusted processing and storage — are prohibited unless one of five routes applies: (1) the data subject’s separate consent to the cross-border transfer; (2) a special provision in law, a treaty to which Korea is a party, or another international agreement; (3) entrusted processing or storage necessary to conclude and perform a contract with the data subject, where the Art. 28-8(2) items are disclosed in the privacy policy or notified to the data subject by email or another method prescribed by Presidential Decree; (4) the recipient holds a certification under Art. 32-2 or one recognised by PIPC notice and has taken the safety and rights-protection measures required, plus the measures needed to implement the certified matters in the destination country; or (5) PIPC recognises that the destination country or international organisation has a protection system, scope of rights guarantees and remedial procedures substantially equivalent to this Act. Before consent under route (1), the data subject must be informed of the items transferred, the destination country, timing and method, the recipient’s name and contact details, the recipient’s purpose and retention period, and the method, procedure and effect of refusing; any change requires fresh notice and consent. Contracts for cross-border transfer whose content breaches this Act are prohibited.

Applies when
Chinese AI companies routing Korean users’ or customers’ personal information into China for training, inference, annotation, support or operations. Mainland China is not currently recognised under route (5), so in practice route (1), (3) or (4) must be used.
Evidence to retain
  • · Cross-border transfer register: recipient, country, data items, purpose, retention period
  • · Separate consent UI and consent records, or archived privacy-policy disclosure page
  • · Certification documents and description of measures implementing the certified matters in the destination country (route 4)
  • · The cross-border transfer contract with legal review confirming it does not breach PIPA
  • · Records of fresh notice and consent where transfer particulars changed

Estimated first-time effort: 10–25 person-days (estimate, not a commitment)

Designate a domestic representative and disclose it in the privacy policy

Severity CriticalArt. 31-2

A controller with no address or place of business in Korea that meets the revenue and data-holding thresholds set by Presidential Decree must designate a domestic representative in writing to handle: complaint handling and damage relief under Art. 31(4)5; the notifications under Art. 34(1)–(2) and the breach report under Art. 34(4); and the submission of materials under Art. 63(1). The representative must have an address or place of business in Korea; where the controller has established a Korean corporation, or a Korean corporation over which it exercises dominant influence on officer appointments or business operations, the representative must be designated from among those entities. The controller must educate, inspect and supervise the representative as prescribed by Presidential Decree. The representative’s name, address, telephone number and email must appear in the privacy policy. A violation by the representative in respect of those matters is deemed committed by the controller.

Applies when
Chinese AI companies with no Korean entity that operate apps, websites or model APIs for Korean users. Where a Korean subsidiary exists, the representative must be designated from within it rather than a third party.
Evidence to retain
  • · Written designation of the domestic representative
  • · Screenshot of the representative’s details in the published privacy policy
  • · Records of education and business-status inspection of the representative
  • · Register of complaints and breach reports handled by the representative

Estimated first-time effort: 5–12 person-days (estimate, not a commitment)

Notify data subjects and report to PIPC on a breach, including the new 2026 duty to notify a possible leak

Severity CriticalArt. 34

On becoming aware that personal information has been leaked or otherwise compromised, the controller must without delay inform data subjects of the Art. 34(1) items: the data items involved; the time and circumstances; the specific steps the data subject can take to minimise harm; the controller’s response measures and damage-relief procedures; the department and contact point for reports of harm; the legal rights arising from the breach — damages under Art. 39, statutory damages under Art. 39-2 and dispute mediation under Art. 43 — and how to exercise them; and other matters prescribed by Presidential Decree. The 2026 amendment adds Art. 34(2): where the controller becomes aware of circumstances indicating a possibility of a leak, as prescribed by Presidential Decree, it must without delay inform all potentially affected data subjects of the prescribed matters. The controller must also take measures to prevent the spread of harm, including recovery and deletion, and must report to PIPC or a specialised body without delay as prescribed.

Applies when
All controllers processing Korean personal information; entrusted processors should contractually guarantee immediate notification to the principal so it can meet its own deadlines.
Deadline: Without delay; the precise timing and reporting method are prescribed by Presidential Decree
Applies from: 2026-09-11
Evidence to retain
  • · Incident response plan covering the Korean reporting path and Korean-language notice templates
  • · Data-subject notice text covering every Art. 34(1) item
  • · Record of the report filed with PIPC or the designated specialised body
  • · Assessment record of a possible leak and proof that notification was sent
  • · Execution records of measures preventing the spread of harm, including recovery and deletion

Estimated first-time effort: 6–15 person-days (estimate, not a commitment)

Right to refuse automated decisions, to request an explanation, and duty to publish the criteria

Severity HighArt. 37-2

Article 37-2 provides that where a decision is made by processing personal information through a fully automated system, including one applying artificial intelligence technology, and that decision significantly affects the data subject’s rights or obligations, the data subject may require the controller to refuse to apply it — except where the decision is made under Art. 15(1)1, 2 or 4. The data subject may also request an explanation of an automated decision already made. On receiving such a request the controller must, absent justifiable grounds, refrain from applying the automated decision or take necessary measures such as human re-processing and explanation. The controller must also publish, in a form the data subject can readily check, the criteria and procedure for automated decisions and the way personal information is processed.

Applies when
Chinese AI products in Korea with automated approval, credit scoring, CV screening, insurance pricing, content distribution or risk-based blocking. Purely recommendatory features without significant effect on rights or obligations require a case-by-case assessment.
Evidence to retain
  • · Inventory of automated decisions with the “significant effect” assessment
  • · Published page describing the decision criteria, procedure and processing method
  • · Register of refusal and explanation requests with handling and responses
  • · Standard operating procedure and execution records for human re-processing
  • · Written justification where a request is not acceded to on justifiable grounds

Estimated first-time effort: 10–25 person-days (estimate, not a commitment)

Owner/representative accountability and appointment of the Chief Privacy Officer

Severity HighArts. 30-3, 31

The 2026 amendment inserts Art. 30-3, expressly designating the business owner or representative as the person ultimately responsible for the processing and protection of personal information. Article 31 is strengthened accordingly: the controller must secure the staffing and budget the CPO needs, controllers meeting the Presidential Decree thresholds must file the designation, change or removal of the CPO with the competent authority, and such designation, change or removal must be resolved by the board of directors. Designating a person who does not meet the CPO qualification requirements, failing to obtain a board resolution, or failing to file, attracts administrative fines under Art. 75(2).

Applies when
Controllers with a Korean corporation or meeting the Presidential Decree thresholds; Korean subsidiaries of Chinese groups must put the CPO designation on the board agenda.
Applies from: 2026-09-11
Evidence to retain
  • · Board resolution appointing the CPO and the filing acknowledgement
  • · Documentation verifying the CPO qualification requirements
  • · Evidence of the staffing and budget secured for the CPO
  • · Internal governance document recording the owner’s or representative’s accountability

Estimated first-time effort: 5–12 person-days (estimate, not a commitment)

Implement safety-assurance measures and prevent violations by entrusted processors

Severity CriticalArts. 26(4), 29, 64-2(1)9

Article 29 requires technical, managerial and physical measures to ensure safety and prevent loss, theft, leakage, forgery, alteration or damage of personal information. Article 64-2(1)9 makes a leak itself surcharge-eligible unless the controller has taken all the measures necessary under Art. 29 — which makes the evidence of Art. 29 implementation the core of any defence. Article 26(4) requires the entrusting controller to supervise and train the entrusted processor, and a failure that results in a violation by that processor is itself surcharge-eligible.

Applies when
All entities processing Korean personal information, including Chinese vendors acting as entrusted processors.
Evidence to retain
  • · Evidence pack of safety measures across technical, managerial and physical categories
  • · Configuration evidence for encryption, access control and log retention
  • · Entrustment agreements plus training and supervision records for processors
  • · Periodic security assessments with remediation closure records

Estimated first-time effort: 12–30 person-days (estimate, not a commitment)

Obtain privacy certification where the size thresholds are met

Severity HighArts. 32-2(1) proviso, 75(2)15, 28-8(1)4

The 2026 amendment adds a proviso to Art. 32-2(1): controllers meeting thresholds set by Presidential Decree on revenue and processing scale must obtain privacy certification. That provision and Art. 75(2)15 (administrative fine for failing to obtain certification) commence on 1 July 2027, so the certification lead time should be planned in advance. Article 28-8(1)4 also makes holding such certification one of the routes for cross-border transfer, so certification carries both compliance and commercial value.

Applies when
Controllers meeting the Presidential Decree thresholds in Korea, and companies intending to use the certification route to support transfers back to China.
Deadline: The mandatory certification duty applies from 1 July 2027
Applies from: 2027-07-01
Evidence to retain
  • · Assessment of whether the size thresholds apply
  • · Gap analysis and remediation plan for certification readiness
  • · Certification application and certificate
  • · Description of measures implementing the certified matters in the destination country, where used as a transfer route

Estimated first-time effort: 20–60 person-days (estimate, not a commitment)

Penalties

Article 64-2(1): surcharges of up to 3% of total revenue — or up to KRW 2 billion where there is no revenue or it cannot be calculated — for processing in breach of Arts. 15(1), 17(1), 18(1)–(2) and 19; processing a child under 14’s data without the legal representative’s consent; processing sensitive information without consent; unlawfully processing unique identifying information or resident registration numbers; a failure of management, supervision or training under Art. 26(4) that leads to a breach by the entrusted party; processing pseudonymised information to identify a specific individual contrary to Art. 28-5(1); unlawful cross-border transfer under Art. 28-8(1); failure to comply with an Art. 28-9 transfer suspension order; and leakage of personal information. Article 64-2(2), added in 2026: up to 10% of total revenue — or KRW 5 billion where revenue is absent or not ascertainable — where the processor repeats the same category of violation within three years of a surcharge order (limited to intent or gross negligence), where an intentional or grossly negligent violation affects 10 million or more data subjects, or where a leak occurs after failure to comply with an Art. 64(1) corrective order. Surcharges are calculated on revenue net of turnover unrelated to the violation, and are mitigated for processors that have invested in budget, staffing and equipment, except in cases of intent or gross negligence.

Known uncertainty

The domestic-representative thresholds, the size thresholds for mandatory certification, the circumstances triggering notification of a possible leak and the matters to be disclosed, and the reporting deadlines, all sit in the PIPA Enforcement Decree. This pass verified the statute and the publication details of the latest Decree (Presidential Decree No. 36671, promulgated 10 Sep 2026, in force 11 Sep 2026 — see krlaw-kr-pipa-decree) but did not review the Decree text article by article, so specific figures must be confirmed against it. The Korean provisions cited were obtained through the official open API; the Chinese and English renderings here are research translations, not official translations.

Related public cases

  • Korean PIPC’s corrective recommendations to DeepSeek: no separate consent for transfers, user input sent to Volcano, no domestic agent2025
  • Temu fined KRW 1.369 billion by the Korean PIPC for unlawful cross-border transfers and RRN processing, plus KRW 17.6 million for undisclosed offshore processing and no domestic agent2025

Related standards

  • ISO/IEC 27701:2025 Privacy information management systems — Requirements and guidance · ISO/IEC 27701:2025 (edition 2, 2025-10), cancelling and replacing ISO/IEC 27701:2019

Sources (4)

Content as of 2026-09-12 · corpus 2026.09|Compiled from public official sources with links and review dates for compliance decision support. Rules change; have licensed professionals review before external disclosure, regulatory filing or contractual commitments.

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