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European UnionIn forceRelevance to Chinese AI firms: HighCybersecurity

EU NIS 2 Directive

Directive (EU) 2022/2555 on measures for a high common level of cybersecurity across the Union, amending Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 and Directive (EU) 2018/1972, and repealing Directive (EU) 2016/1148

European Parliament and Council of the European Union · Directive (EU) 2022/2555

The horizontal EU cybersecurity baseline. Scope is set by Annex I (sectors of high criticality, including digital infrastructure and business-to-business ICT service management) and Annex II (other critical sectors, including online marketplaces, online search engines, social networking platforms and research organisations), with entities split by size into "essential" and "important" and supervised with different intensity. The core duties are the Art. 21 all-hazards cybersecurity risk-management measures (at least ten categories, including supply chain security and multi-factor authentication), the Art. 20 management body approval and training duty, the Art. 23 staged incident reporting (24-hour early warning, 72-hour notification, one-month final report), and the Art. 27 registry duty for certain entities. Being a directive, it requires national transposition and thresholds and enforcement details vary by country.

Verified against official sources · 2026-09-12Partly secondary sources — verify before relying

Does this apply to me?

Typical triggers: a Chinese company providing cloud computing, data centre, content delivery network, managed services or managed security services in the EU (Annex I points 8 and 9), or operating an online marketplace, online search engine or social networking platform (Annex II point 6), and qualifying as a medium-sized enterprise under Recommendation 2003/361/EC or exceeding those ceilings. An entity not established in the Union but offering such services there must designate a representative under Art. 26(3) in one of the Member States where the services are offered, and falls under that Member State’s jurisdiction; where no representative is designated, any Member State in which it provides services may take legal action against it. Note that a plain SaaS application is not necessarily a "cloud computing service"; whether it is caught depends on the national transposing definition and must be checked country by country.

Key industries: Enterprise SaaS, GenAI & foundation models, AI hardware & compute, All industries

Application timeline

  1. 2023-01-16

    Directive enters into force

    Enters into force on the twentieth day following publication. This date is also the reference point in Art. 3(1)(g): Member States may treat entities identified before 16 January 2023 as operators of essential services under Directive (EU) 2016/1148 or national law as essential entities. National legal effect still follows transposition.

  2. 2024-10-17

    Transposition deadline for Member States

    Member States had to adopt and publish the national measures necessary to comply and inform the Commission immediately.

  3. 2024-10-18

    National measures apply; Directive (EU) 2016/1148 repealed

    Member States must apply the transposing measures from this date; Art. 19 of Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 and Arts. 40 and 41 of Directive (EU) 2018/1972 are deleted with effect from the same date.

  4. 2025-01-17

    Registry information submission deadline for digital infrastructure and ICT service management entities

    Under Art. 27(2), DNS service providers, TLD name registries, entities providing domain name registration services, cloud computing service providers, data centre service providers, content delivery network providers, managed service providers, managed security service providers, and providers of online marketplaces, online search engines and social networking services platforms had to submit to the competent authorities their name, sector and entity type, the address of their main establishment (or of the representative designated under Art. 26(3) if not established in the Union), contact details, the Member States where they provide services, and their IP ranges.

  5. 2025-04-17

    Member States must establish the list of essential and important entities

    Art. 3(3) requires Member States to establish, by this date, a list of essential and important entities including entities providing domain name registration services, and to review it periodically.

Obligations (5)

Each states its trigger, the evidence to retain and the clause it comes from

Designating an EU representative and registering with the competent authority

Severity HighArt. 26(3), Art. 27

Entities listed in Art. 26(1)(b) — including cloud computing service providers, data centre service providers, content delivery network providers, managed service and managed security service providers, and providers of online marketplaces, online search engines and social networking platforms — that are not established in the Union but offer services there must designate a representative in one of the Member States where the services are offered, and are then under that Member State’s jurisdiction. Art. 27(2) requires such entities to submit to the competent authorities their name, sector and entity type, the address of their main establishment or of the representative, contact details, the Member States served and their IP ranges, and Art. 27(3) requires notification of any change without delay and in any event within three months of the change.

Applies when
Companies established in China offering cloud, managed, CDN or managed security services, or operating platform businesses, into the EU. Designating a representative is not merely formal: it determines which Member State authority supervises and can fine you.
Deadline: The Art. 27(2) submission deadline was 17 Jan 2025; changes must be notified within three months.
Applies from: 2024-10-18
Evidence to retain
  • · Representative appointment documents and proof of establishment
  • · Registry information submitted to the competent authority and the acknowledgement
  • · Records of change notifications filed within three months
  • · Inventory of services and Member States served, used to determine jurisdiction

Estimated first-time effort: 5–12 person-days (estimate, not a commitment)

All-hazards cybersecurity risk-management measures (the ten baseline categories)

Severity HighArt. 21(1)-(2)

Entities must take appropriate and proportionate technical, operational and organisational measures to manage the risks to the security of the network and information systems they use for their operations or services, and to prevent or minimise the impact of incidents on service recipients and other services. The measures must follow an all-hazards approach and include at least: (a) policies on risk analysis and information system security; (b) incident handling; (c) business continuity such as backup management and disaster recovery, and crisis management; (d) supply chain security, including security aspects of relationships with direct suppliers and service providers; (e) security in network and information system acquisition, development and maintenance, including vulnerability handling and disclosure; (f) policies and procedures to assess the effectiveness of the measures; (g) basic cyber hygiene practices and cybersecurity training; (h) policies and procedures on cryptography and, where appropriate, encryption; (i) human resources security, access control policies and asset management; and (j) the use of multi-factor or continuous authentication, secured voice, video and text communications and secured emergency communication systems within the entity, where appropriate.

Applies when
EU entities of Chinese groups within NIS2 scope, or entities under the jurisdiction established by their designated representative. There is substantial overlap with ISO/IEC 27001, but points (d) and (j) — supply chain security and multi-factor authentication — are usually where the largest gaps sit.
Applies from: 2024-10-18
Evidence to retain
  • · Information security management system documentation with an item-by-item mapping to the ten categories
  • · Risk assessment reports and treatment plans
  • · Business continuity and disaster recovery exercise records
  • · Periodic assessment reports on the effectiveness of the measures

Estimated first-time effort: 30–80 person-days (estimate, not a commitment)

Supply chain and direct supplier security management

Severity HighArt. 21(2)(d), Art. 21(3)

When assessing whether the Art. 21(2)(d) supply chain measures are appropriate, entities must take into account the vulnerabilities specific to each direct supplier and service provider and the overall quality of products and cybersecurity practices of those suppliers, including their secure development procedures, and must take into account the results of the coordinated security risk assessments of critical supply chains carried out under Art. 22(1). For an AI supply chain this means model vendors, GPU clouds, annotation outsourcers and open-source components all fall within the assessment.

Applies when
Entities within NIS2 scope. Chinese AI companies usually meet this provision first as suppliers: EU customers push NIS2 requirements upstream through contracts, creating a de facto compliance obligation.
Applies from: 2024-10-18
Evidence to retain
  • · Direct supplier inventory with tiered assessment records
  • · Supplier security questionnaires and collected audits or certificates
  • · Security and incident-notification clauses in contracts
  • · Inventory of open-source and third-party components with vulnerability monitoring records

Estimated first-time effort: 15–40 person-days (estimate, not a commitment)

Staged significant-incident reporting at 24 hours, 72 hours and one month

Severity CriticalArt. 23(1)-(4)

On an incident having a significant impact on the provision of services, the entity must notify its CSIRT or, where applicable, the competent authority without undue delay, and where appropriate notify the recipients of its services likely to be adversely affected. An incident is significant if it has caused or is capable of causing severe operational disruption or financial loss for the entity, or has affected or is capable of affecting other natural or legal persons by causing considerable material or non-material damage. Reporting is staged: an early warning within 24 hours of becoming aware, indicating where applicable whether the incident is suspected of being caused by unlawful or malicious acts or could have cross-border impact; an incident notification within 72 hours updating the early warning with an initial assessment including severity and impact and, where available, indicators of compromise; an intermediate report on request of the CSIRT or competent authority; and a final report under Art. 23(4). Entities must also, where appropriate, communicate without undue delay to potentially affected service recipients any measures or remedies they can take in response to a significant cyber threat.

Applies when
Entities within NIS2 scope. The NIS2 and GDPR clocks are separate: a security incident involving personal data typically triggers both the NIS2 24-hour early warning and the GDPR 72-hour notification, so both must be sequenced in the same playbook.
Deadline: 24-hour early warning; 72-hour incident notification; final report as required by Art. 23(4).
Applies from: 2024-10-18
Evidence to retain
  • · Incident severity criteria and significance determination records
  • · Submission records and acknowledgements for the 24-hour early warning, 72-hour notification and final report
  • · Notification text and delivery records for service recipients
  • · Playbook sequencing the NIS2 clock alongside the GDPR breach notification clock

Estimated first-time effort: 8–20 person-days (estimate, not a commitment)

Management body approval, oversight liability and mandatory training

Severity HighArt. 20

Member States must ensure that the management bodies of essential and important entities approve the cybersecurity risk-management measures taken to comply with Art. 21, oversee their implementation, and can be held liable for the entity’s infringements of that Article. Members of management bodies must also follow training, and entities are encouraged to offer similar training to employees regularly, so that they gain sufficient knowledge and skills to identify risks and assess cybersecurity risk-management practices and their impact on the services provided.

Applies when
Boards and executives of entities within NIS2 scope. For the EU subsidiary of a Chinese group this means cybersecurity cannot sit only with IT: EU directors need a written trail of approval and oversight, or personal liability exposure is real.
Applies from: 2024-10-18
Evidence to retain
  • · Board resolutions or minutes approving the cybersecurity measures
  • · Periodic oversight reporting packs and records of management’s comments
  • · Training records and certificates for management body members
  • · Employee cybersecurity training plan and completion statistics

Estimated first-time effort: 5–12 person-days (estimate, not a commitment)

Penalties

Art. 34 sets minimum maxima: Member States must ensure that essential entities infringing Art. 21 or Art. 23 face administrative fines of a maximum of at least EUR 10 000 000 or at least 2% of the total worldwide annual turnover of the undertaking to which the entity belongs in the preceding financial year, whichever is higher; and that important entities face a maximum of at least EUR 7 000 000 or at least 1.4% of worldwide annual turnover, whichever is higher. Member States may also provide for periodic penalty payments to compel an entity to cease an infringement. Arts. 32(4)-(5) and 33(4) additionally allow non-monetary measures such as suspending a certification or authorisation and temporarily prohibiting a natural person from exercising managerial functions.

Known uncertainty

Confidence is set to medium because NIS2 is a directive, not a regulation: whether an entity is in scope, how the size thresholds are computed, the actual fine ranges, and the registration and reporting channels all depend on national transposing law. This entry verifies the directive text only and does not verify transposition country by country, and national transposition status and wording continue to change. Companies should re-verify against the law of the Member State of their main establishment or representative.

Related standards

  • ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Information security management systems — Requirements · ISO/IEC 27001:2022 (edition 3, 2022-10); European adoption EN ISO/IEC 27001:2023, including Amendment A1:2024
  • ISO/IEC 27002:2022 Information security controls · ISO/IEC 27002:2022 (2022-02-15; European adoption EN ISO/IEC 27002:2022, including Corrigendum AC:2024)

Sources (1)

Content as of 2026-09-12 · corpus 2026.09|Compiled from public official sources with links and review dates for compliance decision support. Rules change; have licensed professionals review before external disclosure, regulatory filing or contractual commitments.

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EU NIS 2 Directive · Obligations & official sources | HaiWen HQ