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UN Regulation No 155: cybersecurity and cybersecurity management system

Uniform provisions concerning the approval of vehicles with regards to cybersecurity and cybersecurity management system (UN Regulation No 155 [2021/387])

UNECE World Forum for Harmonization of Vehicle Regulations (WP.29) · UN Regulation No 155 [2021/387]

UN R155 turns vehicle cybersecurity into a two-layer approval of organisational capability plus vehicle-type evidence. The manufacturer must first obtain a Cybersecurity Management System (CSMS) certificate of compliance, valid for a maximum of three years, and then demonstrate for each vehicle type that an exhaustive risk assessment has been performed, that the Annex 5 mitigations have been implemented, and that continual monitoring, detection and response capability covers vehicles after first registration. Approval authorities must refuse cybersecurity type approval where the manufacturer has not performed the exhaustive risk assessment or has not considered all Annex 5 Part A threats.

Verified against official sources · 2026-09-12Partly secondary sources — verify before relying

Does this apply to me?

A Chinese company is caught when, as a vehicle manufacturer, it exports passenger or commercial vehicles to Contracting Parties applying the Regulation (including the EU, the UK, Japan and Korea) and seeks type approval; when, as a Tier 1 or Tier 2 supplier, it supplies ECUs, domain controllers, telematics units, cockpit systems or automated-driving software to such manufacturers — since paragraph 7.2.2.5 requires the vehicle manufacturer to demonstrate how its CSMS manages dependencies on contracted suppliers and service providers, those requirements are pushed down into supply contracts and audits; and when it provides connected-car cloud platforms, OTA back ends or security operations services for overseas vehicle types. Vehicle types sold only in China are out of scope, but platform reuse across markets requires deliberate regional differentiation.

Key industries: Autonomous driving, AI hardware & compute

Application timeline

  1. 2021-01-22

    UN Regulation No 155 enters into force

    Contracting Parties to the 1958 Agreement applying the Regulation may from this date issue CSMS certificates of compliance and vehicle type approvals for cybersecurity.

  2. 2022-07-06

    EU: UN R155 becomes mandatory for new vehicle type approvals

    Regulation (EU) 2019/2144 applies from that date (Article 18). **The mandatory date is in Annex II, not in the articles**: Annex II item D4 "Protection of vehicle against cyberattacks" — whose "Regulatory acts" column in the consolidated text reads UN Regulation No 155 — is marked "B" for all eight columns M1, M2, M3, N1, N2, N3 and O1–O4, and the Annex II "Notes to the table" define the first date under B as "Date for refusal to grant EU type-approval: 6 July 2022". From that date a new vehicle type seeking EU type approval must hold the CSMS and vehicle-type cybersecurity approval required by UN R155. Recitals 26 and 27 give the policy rationale.

  3. 2024-07-01

    The "technically not feasible" exception for Annex 5 mitigations ends for new approvals

    Paragraph 7.3.4 allows manufacturers to implement an alternative mitigation, with a technical feasibility assessment provided to the approval authority, only for type approvals prior to 1 July 2024; approvals applied for afterwards no longer benefit from that transitional arrangement.

  4. 2024-07-07

    EU: UN R155 becomes mandatory for the registration of all new vehicles

    The Annex II "Notes to the table" define the second date under B as "Date for the prohibition of the registration of vehicles, as well as the placing on the market and entry into service of components and separate technical units: 7 July 2024". From that date vehicles not meeting item D4 (UN R155) may not be registered in the EU, and the related components and separate technical units may not be placed on the market or put into service — closing the window in which existing types could still be sold under older approvals. Note this is six days after the 1 July 2024 transitional cut-off inside UN R155 paragraph 7.3.4: two different dates under two different instruments, which must not be conflated in a filing plan.

Obligations (5)

Each states its trigger, the evidence to retain and the clause it comes from

Obtain and maintain the CSMS certificate of compliance (maximum three-year validity)

Severity Criticalparas 6.1–6.11;Annex 1 Appendix 1;Annex 4

The vehicle manufacturer or its duly accredited representative applies to the approval authority designated by the Contracting Party for a CSMS assessment. On satisfactory completion and receipt of a signed declaration in the Annex 1 Appendix 1 model, a CSMS certificate of compliance in the Annex 4 model is granted. It is valid for a maximum of three years from issue unless withdrawn. The manufacturer must apply for a new or extended certificate in due time before expiry and must inform the approval authority or its technical service of any change affecting the relevance of the certificate, which then decides whether new checks are needed.

Applies when
Vehicle manufacturers applying for cybersecurity type approval; multi-brand groups must confirm the certificate scope matches the applicant entity.
Evidence to retain
  • · CSMS certificate of compliance (Annex 4 model) and a validity tracker
  • · Signed manufacturer declaration in the Annex 1 Appendix 1 model
  • · CSMS assessment report and non-conformity closure records
  • · Lead-time management record for renewal or extension applications
  • · Notifications of changes affecting certificate relevance and the authority responses

Estimated first-time effort: 60–180 person-days (estimate, not a commitment)

Perform an exhaustive risk assessment per vehicle type covering all Annex 5 Part A threats

Severity Criticalparas 5.1.3, 7.3.1, 7.3.3;Annex 5 Part A

The manufacturer must identify the critical elements of the vehicle type, perform an exhaustive risk assessment for that type and treat or manage the identified risks appropriately. The assessment must consider the individual elements of the vehicle type and their interactions, and must further consider interactions with any external systems; it must cover all the threats listed in Annex 5 Part A as well as any other relevant risk. Failure to perform the exhaustive assessment, including failure to consider all Annex 5 Part A threats, is a ground for the approval authority to refuse approval.

Applies when
Every vehicle type seeking cybersecurity type approval; platform-derived types must justify differences and the boundaries of reuse.
Evidence to retain
  • · Inventory of critical elements and definition of system boundaries for the vehicle type
  • · TARA report with an item-by-item mapping to the Annex 5 Part A threats
  • · Risk analysis for interactions with external systems (cloud platform, charging infrastructure, mobile app, V2X)
  • · Risk treatment decisions and residual risk acceptance records
  • · Process and re-assessment records keeping the risk assessment current

Estimated first-time effort: 30–90 person-days (estimate, not a commitment)

Implement the relevant Annex 5 Part B and C mitigations or justify alternatives

Severity Highpara 7.3.4;Annex 5 Parts B and C

The manufacturer must protect the vehicle type against the risks identified in its risk assessment by implementing proportionate mitigations, which must include all mitigations referred to in Annex 5 Parts B and C that are relevant to the identified risks. Where such a mitigation is not relevant or not sufficient, another appropriate mitigation must be implemented. For type approvals prior to 1 July 2024 an alternative mitigation could be used where the Annex 5 measure was technically not feasible, with the feasibility assessment provided to the approval authority.

Applies when
Vehicle manufacturers, cascaded through supply contracts to Chinese suppliers of the affected ECUs, communication modules and software.
Evidence to retain
  • · Traceability matrix mapping Annex 5 Part B and C mitigations to the implementation in the vehicle type
  • · Justification where a mitigation is not relevant or not sufficient and description of the substitute
  • · Verification and penetration test reports for the mitigations
  • · Where applicable, the technical feasibility assessment and the record of its submission to the approval authority

Estimated first-time effort: 25–80 person-days (estimate, not a commitment)

Continually monitor, detect and respond to cyberattacks and vulnerabilities on registered vehicles

Severity Criticalparas 7.2.2.2(g)–(h), 7.2.2.3, 7.2.2.4

The manufacturer must demonstrate that its CSMS has processes to monitor for, detect and respond to cyberattacks, cyber threats and vulnerabilities on its vehicle types, and to assess whether the implemented measures remain effective against newly identified threats. Monitoring must be continual, must include vehicles after first registration, and must include the capability to analyse and detect threats, vulnerabilities and attacks from vehicle data and vehicle logs while respecting the privacy rights of owners and drivers, particularly regarding consent. Threats and vulnerabilities requiring a response must be mitigated within a reasonable timeframe, and the manufacturer must have processes to provide relevant data to support the analysis of attempted or successful attacks.

Applies when
Vehicle manufacturers and the Chinese teams operating their connected-vehicle security monitoring; where logs are transferred from vehicles in the EU, local personal data law applies in parallel.
Evidence to retain
  • · Vehicle security operations centre (VSOC) design and on-duty procedures
  • · Threat intelligence source list, vulnerability severity scheme and response time targets
  • · Documentation of vehicle log collection scope, minimisation and consent mechanisms
  • · Sample monitoring alerts, response tickets and closure records
  • · Retention and provisioning process for data supporting attack analysis

Estimated first-time effort: 40–120 person-days (estimate, not a commitment)

Manage dependencies on suppliers, service providers and sub-organisations within the CSMS

Severity Highpara 7.2.2.5;para 7.2.2.2

The manufacturer must demonstrate how its CSMS manages dependencies that may exist with contracted suppliers, service providers or its own sub-organisations in respect of the requirements of paragraph 7.2.2.2 (risk identification, verification of risk management, cybersecurity testing, keeping the risk assessment current, monitoring, detection and response). In practice this means embedding cybersecurity requirements in purchasing specifications and contracts, auditing suppliers, and agreeing vulnerability notification and investigation cooperation duties.

Applies when
Vehicle manufacturers; equally it determines whether Chinese Tier 1 and Tier 2 suppliers pass their customers CSMS supplier audits and keep their nominations.
Evidence to retain
  • · Supplier cybersecurity requirement set (cybersecurity interface agreement or equivalent)
  • · Supplier audit plan, audit reports and non-conformity closure records
  • · Vulnerability and incident notification clauses, response deadlines and exercise records
  • · Documented responsibility split and interface definitions for sub-organisations

Estimated first-time effort: 15–45 person-days (estimate, not a commitment)

Penalties

The consequences under the Regulation are administrative: the approval authority may refuse to grant type approval (paragraph 5.1.3), may verify compliance at any time and must withdraw the CSMS certificate when the requirements are no longer met, and expiry or withdrawal of the certificate is treated as a modification of the approval for the affected vehicle types, which may lead to withdrawal of the approval. The commercial effect is that the vehicle type cannot be placed on, or must be withdrawn from, the market.

Known uncertainty

The regulation text is verified against the [2021/387] version published in the EU Official Journal (unece.org returned HTTP 403 during this review); supplements and amendment series adopted by WP.29 afterwards could not be verified from first-party text, so supplement-level refinements are not stated here and TRANS/WP.29/343 must be checked before any filing. The EU mandatory dates have now been verified: under Annex II item D4 and note B of the Annex II "Notes to the table" of Regulation (EU) 2019/2144, new vehicle types from 6 July 2022 and registration of all new vehicles from 7 July 2024, identically across the eight vehicle categories; those dates sit in Annex II rather than in the articles, which is why an earlier review wrongly reported that no direct provision existed. Mandatory dates in Contracting Parties outside the EU (the UK, Japan, Korea and others) run on their own timetables and were outside this review.

Related standards

  • ISO/IEC 27001:2022 Information security management systems — Requirements · ISO/IEC 27001:2022 (edition 3, 2022-10); European adoption EN ISO/IEC 27001:2023, including Amendment A1:2024
  • TISAX and the VDA ISA (automotive supply chain information security assessment and exchange) · VDA ISA2027 (officially released by the VDA on 2026-07-01); from 2027 ISA is released in annual versions

Sources (3)

Content as of 2026-09-12 · corpus 2026.09|Compiled from public official sources with links and review dates for compliance decision support. Rules change; have licensed professionals review before external disclosure, regulatory filing or contractual commitments.

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UN Regulation No 155: cybersecurity and cybersecurity management system · Obligations & official sources | HaiWen HQ